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Abstract
Objective To test whether offering financial incentives to patients with
psychotic disorders is effective in improving adherence to maintenance
treatment with antipsychotics.
Design Cluster randomised controlled trial.
Setting Community mental health teams in secondary psychiatric care
in the United Kingdom.
Participants Patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective
disorder, or bipolar disorder, who were prescribed long acting
antipsychotic (depot) injections but had received 75% or less of the
prescribed injections. We randomly allocated 73 teams with a total of
141 patients. Primary outcome data were available for 35 intervention
teams with 75 patients (96% of randomised) and for 31 control teams
with 56 patients (89% of randomised).
Interventions Participants in the intervention group were offered £15
(€17; $22) for each depot injection over a 12 month period. Participants
in the control condition received treatment as usual.
Main outcome measure The primary outcome was the percentage of
prescribed depot injections given during the 12month intervention period.
Results 73 teams with 141 consenting patients were randomised, and
outcomes were assessed for 131 patients (93%).⇓ Average baseline
adherence was 69% in the intervention group and 67% in the control
group. During the 12 month trial period adherence was 85% in the
intervention group and 71% in the control group. The adjusted effect
estimate was 11.5% (95% confidence interval 3.9% to 19.0%, P=0.003).
A secondary outcome was an adherence of ≥95%, which was achieved
in 28% of the intervention group and 5% of the control group (adjusted
odds ratio 8.21, 95% confidence interval 2.00 to 33.67, P=0.003).
Although differences in clinician rated clinical improvement between the
groups failed to reach statistical significance, patients in the intervention
group had more favourable subjective quality of life ratings (β=0.71, 95%
confidence interval 0.26 to 1.15, P=0.002). The number of admissions
to hospital and adverse events were low in both groups and did not show
substantial differences.
Conclusion Offering modest financial incentives to patients with
psychotic disorders is an effective method for improving adherence to
maintenance treatment with antipsychotics.
Trial registration Current Controlled Trials ISRCTN77769281.
Introduction
Poor adherence to antipsychotic drugs is a major problem in
patients with psychotic disorders, linked to increased rates of
readmission to hospital and high treatment costs.1Between 25%
and 80% of patients fail to take their drugs correctly at some
point in their treatment.2 Poor adherence to treatment can treble
the costs of external services.3 Many interventions have been
tried to improve adherence to treatment in patients with
psychotic disorders, including compliance therapy,
psychotherapy, family education, telephone prompting, and
psychoeducation. However, reviews of such interventions find
at best only modest effects, and evidence that any intervention
significantly improves drug adherence in non-adherent patients
with psychotic disorders in the community is inconsistent.4 5
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Indeed, adherence therapy, a client centred approach that aims
to improve adherence by applying cognitive behavioural
methods, is specifically not recommended for people with
schizophrenia and has no clear benefits for patients.6 7
Psychoeducation has been suggested to improve adherence in
patients with bipolar disorders but not in those with
non-affective psychoses.8 Against this background, financial
incentives have been considered in such patients to improve
adherence to drugs.
Systematic reviews of the effectiveness of financial incentives
suggest that they can improve adherence to a range of medical
treatments.9 10 In treatments of mental health, financial incentives
have been shown to encourage attendance at treatment sessions
and outpatient clinics and abstinence from smoking or substance
misuse.11-25 Observational studies with small samples suggest
that financial incentives may also improve drug adherence in
patients with psychotic disorders, yet to date this has not been
tested in a trial.23 26 The idea of using financial incentives to
increase adherence to antipsychotic drugs27 is controversial and
has been debated,28-31 and in surveys clinicians have raised
concerns about it.32 33 In a focus group study, different
stakeholder groups in the United Kingdom identified clinical
effectiveness as critical and highlighted the need for this to be
established by systematic research.34
We conducted a randomised controlled trial to test whether
offering modest financial incentives can improve adherence to
maintenance treatment with antipsychotics in patients with
psychotic disorders and poor adherence.
Methods
The study was a cluster randomised controlled trial with a 1:1
allocation ratio of mental health teams to intervention or control
arm. We tested the hypothesis that offering financial incentives
to patients with psychotic disorders with suboptimal adherence
would improve adherence to maintenance treatment with
antipsychotics.
To prevent contamination of practice within teams and to
facilitate the assessment of overall experiences in teams with
the practice we allocated teams, and not individual patients, at
randomisation. This also made it possible for teams in the
intervention group to offer financial incentives to other patients
outside the study, without compromising the study design.
Teams in the intervention group were therefore in a position to
avoid a potential sense of unfairness among patients cared for
by the same team and being excluded from receiving incentives
through the study design.
Eligible mental health teams were community mental health
teams and assertive outreach teams in England and Wales.
Mental health care in the United Kingdom has been strictly
geographically sectorised for several decades, with
multidisciplinary teams responsible for all patients from defined
geographical areas. The basic model is for community mental
health teams to take all referrals from general practitioners
serving a population of between 20 000 and 70 000. Such teams
carry a mixed caseload of between 200 and 300 patients, of
whom over half will have long term psychotic disorders.
Assertive outreach teams carry caseloads of 60-100 patients
who are mostly psychotic and difficult to engage, referred to
them from community mental health teams. Of these a
significant proportion (often 20-40% in community mental
health teams and over 50% in assertive outreach teams) will
receive depot treatment.
To be included patients had to be under the care of the team for
at least four months; aged between 18 and 65 years; have a
diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, or bipolar
disorder according to the international classification of diseases
(10th revision);35 be prescribed for long acting (depot) injections
of antipsychotic drugs; show poor adherence to antipsychotic
drugs—that is, received 75% or less of prescribed depot
injections over the four months before screening; and have the
capacity to provide informed consent to participate in the study.
Exclusion criteria were intellectual disability and poor command
of English.
Originally we had defined an adherence level of 50% or less as
an inclusion criterion. When discussing the study with clinical
teams, clinicians stated that services would usually prevent
adherence levels dropping below 50% in patients with clinical
risks who were receiving long acting depot injections, and
emphasised that adherence levels between 50% and 75% usually
indicate a significant failure in achieving treatment adherence,
often prompting immediate interventions. In line with this, we
found low numbers of patients with adherence levels of 50%
or less during screening. With the support of the trial steering
committee and the agreement of the funder we subsequently
changed the inclusion criterion to an adherence level of 75% or
less. For the most frequent cycle of fortnightly prescriptions,
this reflects missing one injection or more every two months.
Intervention
Patients in the intervention group were offered £15 for each
injection of antipsychotic drug over a 12month period (intervals
between injections ranging from one to four weeks). Clinicians
gave the monetary incentive in cash directly to patients after
each injection, and patients signed a receipt. We chose the
standard sum of £15 because a fixed sum per injection simplifies
the practice, it is below the limit of £20 per week over which
there would be interference with patients’ entitlements to
disability benefits, and it was considered an important incentive
without inducing financial dependency.
Patients in teams allocated to the control condition received
treatment as usual with no financial or other incentive for taking
their drugs. The type, frequency, and dosage of drugs and all
other interventions were not affected by participation in the
study.
Outcomes
The primary outcome was the percentage of prescribed depots
received in the community within the 12 month trial period.
The percentage was based on the total number of prescribed
and actually received depots in the defined period, independently
of potential delays in administering the depot. Assuming that
adherence during admission to hospital and imprisonment was
affected by context factors, we excluded such periods unless
they were shorter than one depot cycle.
Secondary outcomes were the percentage of patients with at
least 95% adherence, which was meant to reflect practically full
adherence (allowing for one depot per year to be missed in
patients receiving fortnightly prescriptions); patients’ clinical
global improvement at the end of the 12 month study period,
dichotomised as “improved” versus “no change, or worse” from
the clinical improvement component of the clinical global
impression scale36 ranging from 1 (very much improved) to 7
(very much worse), rated by the consultant psychiatrist or other
clinician; patients’ subjective quality of life rated on the
DIALOG scale,37 which has eight items on satisfaction with
different life domains, ranging from 1 (lowest satisfaction) to
7 (highest satisfaction) and has been shown to have good
psychometric properties38 in patients living in the community
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with psychotic disorders; patients’ satisfaction with drug rated
on one item, also contained in the DIALOG scale, and ranging
from 1 to 7; number of involuntary and voluntary hospital
admissions and adverse events during the 12month period (that
is, attempted and completed suicides, incidents of physical
violence, and police arrests); and time spent in work, training,
and education.
We recorded all adverse events, including those possibly
attributable to the intervention. All data other than clinical global
impression and DIALOG were obtained from patient medical
records. We collected data going back 12 months from the date
of randomisation (baseline), and then again going back 12
months from 372 days after randomisation, allowing seven days
after randomisation for the intervention to begin. The only
exception to this was the baseline depot card data, which we
collected going back 12 months from the date of screening.
The protocol had prespecified further secondary outcomes that
are not reported here. These concern cost effectiveness, since
this would require the reporting of much additional and complex
information about the utilisation of formal and informal support;
slippage—that is, delays of received injections compared with
the prescribed dates, as such delays are a more meaningful
outcome, if adherence levels do not differ (that is, if the two
groups did not significantly differ in the primary outcome, which
is reported in this paper); and 18 months’ outcomes, because
outcomes beyond the 12 month study period were influenced
by additional factors that were no longer experimentally
controlled. After the 12 month period clinicians in the
intervention teams were free to continue or discontinue offering
incentives, and clinicians in the control teams could decide to
offer incentives to their patients.
Recruitment procedure
We approached both community mental health teams and
assertive outreach teams in England and Wales. Researchers
then visited interested teams to discuss the study. Written
informed consent to participate was obtained from team
managers or consultant psychiatrists, or both.
A team clinician approached eligible patients in participating
teams and, if they agreed, they were contacted by a researcher
who explained the study in detail, obtained written informed
consent, and asked them to rate their subjective quality of life.
After this one-off contact, the participants were not required to
provide any more information or be contacted by a researcher
again. We expected that patients with psychosis and poor
adherence to the prescribed treatment would be difficult to
recruit to research, in particular to randomised controlled trials
like this one in which they could be allocated to a control
condition with no personal benefit. We therefore minimised the
burden on patients and did not require them to participate in
any research interview after providing written informed consent.
Any more requirements could have made the study more
difficult to implement and introduced an additional selection
bias. As a result, we obtained basic clinical characteristics such
as diagnosis and length of illness from clinicians and records
but did not assess the participants for symptoms. Only if patients
volunteered to be contacted again at the end of the trial would
a researcher attempt such contact to ask them to rate their
subjective quality of life.
After all eligible participants in one team had been contacted
and consent obtained, the teamwas randomised and a researcher
informed them of their allocation.
Sample size
We initially assumed that three participants in each teamwould
provide data, that the cluster size would be almost constant, and
that the intracluster correlation coefficient would be 0.05. To
detect a shift in mean adherence from 65% to 85% (assuming
a standard deviation in each group of 30%) with 90% power at
the 5% significance level, we estimated that we would require
47 participants in each group.We inflated this to 68 participants
in each group (four patients in each of 17 clusters) to allow for
clustering and drop out. Thus we planned to recruit 136
participants in total from about 68 teams. During the trial it
became clear that the average cluster size was smaller, with a
mean of only two patients for each cluster, but cluster sizes were
more variable. In addition, the standard deviation of the baseline
adherence of patients was smaller than that assumed in the
original sample size calculation. In the light of these changes
we reviewed the sample size calculation. However, when all
the changes in the inputs to the calculation were considered, the
sample size required was virtually unchanged and so no changes
were made.
Randomisation and masking
An independent statistician at the Pragmatic Clinical Trials Unit,
Queen Mary University of London, randomised the teams. The
teams were stratified according to the deprivation of the area in
which they operated, based on national data from the mental
illness needs index score (low v high)39 as teams in areas with
higher deprivation were supposed to have more eligible
participants, and possibly more challenging ones. A sequence
of allocations in each stratum was generated using the “ralloc”
command in Stata.40 41 Sixty group allocations were generated
for each stratum, arranged in blocks of random length (2, 4, or
6), with a randomisation ratio of 1:1.
It was not possible to blind participants or clinicians, because
receipt of an incentive cannot be disguised. The primary
outcome and also secondary outcomes, with the exceptions of
the clinician rated global clinical improvement and the
participants’ rated subjective quality of life, were obtained from
the medical records and should not be biased by lack of clinician
masking.
Statistical analysis
A substantial delay usually occurred between the screening of
participants and randomisation of the teams. We calculated the
periods in hospital and in prison and baseline adherence for the
baseline period. In calculating adherence, we considered
treatment cycles, changes of cycles, and periods without depot
prescription.
We modelled the effect on the primary outcome (percentage
adherence) using a linear mixed effects regression model with
a random effect for clinical treatment team. In the main analysis
we used data from all participants who had at least four months
of complete data during both the baseline and the intervention
periods, on an intention to treat basis. We also carried out an
analysis excluding patients with protocol violations for
diagnoses not meeting the inclusion criteria, or more than 75%
adherence in the four months before screening, using the same
model specification as described. Further sensitivity analyses
were conducted without adjustment for baseline adherence,
excluding all patients with more than 75% adherence in the
whole baseline period (rather than only four months), and only
for participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia.
We adjusted all models assessing the effect of the
intervention—on both primary and secondary outcomes—for
No commercial reuse: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
BMJ 2013;347:f5847 doi: 10.1136/bmj.f5847 (Published 7 October 2013) Page 3 of 10
RESEARCH
category of mental illness needs index score and average
baseline prescription cycle. Except for clinical global
improvement, which was measured only at the end of the trial,
we also included the baseline measure of the outcome. In the
absence of any hypothesis about a moderating effect of a specific
sociodemographic variable, we did not plan to adjust for
sociodemographic variables.
The effects on the binary secondary outcomes of achieving at
least 95% adherence and improvement on the clinical global
improvement scale were modelled using mixed effects logistic
regression. We estimated the effect on subjective quality of life
using a random effects model fitted by generalised least squares,
since the mixed model did not converge. Admissions to hospital
and adverse events were expected to be infrequent, and we
therefore report the differences descriptively.
Results
Of 540 teams approached, 184 consented to take part in the
study (figure⇓). Overall, 73 teams with 141 consenting patients
were randomised between 16 April 2010 and 15 November
2011. Ninety three consenting teams had no eligible patients,
and in a further 18 teams we failed to recruit eligible patients.
Two patients withdrew directly after randomisation to the control
group. One patient recruited to the control group was
subsequently found to be ineligible during the baseline data
collection because antipsychotic depot treatment had not been
prescribed at the time of recruitment. Four patients did not meet
the inclusion criteria for diagnosis but were included in the
analysis. The original screening information on adherence in
the previous four months was taken from a range of sources.
This information was later checked against the records, and
seven participants in the intervention group and four in the
control group were found to be adherent. These participants
were also included in the primary analysis but, together with
the four with excluded diagnoses, were removed for the per
protocol analysis. Table 1⇓ lists the baseline characteristics of
the sample.
The characteristics of the two groups, including their length of
illness, were similar. Thirty five intervention group teams with
75 patients and 31 control group teamswith 56 patients provided
primary outcome data. These data were missing on average for
7% of the time during the one year study period in the
intervention group and for 14% of the time in the control group.
Of those, 32 teams with 71 patients from the intervention group
and 30 teams with 52 patients from the control group had
sufficient data on adherence during both baseline and
intervention period and were included in the primary analysis
(figure).
Out of the 131 patients with primary outcome data, three (2%)
were prescribed an injection every week (two in the intervention
group, 3%; one in the control group, 2%) during the one year
study period. Eighty (61%) were prescribed an injection every
two weeks (n=51, 68%; n=29, 52%), seven (5%) every three
weeks (n=4, 5%; n=3, 5%), and 31 (24%) every four weeks
(n=13, 17%; n=18, 32%). For 10 (8%) patients the prescription
cycle varied (n=5, 7%; n=5, 9%). The average prescription cycle
for the study period was similar to that of the baseline period
(table 1).
Primary outcome
Table 2⇓ shows the effect of financial incentives on adherence
to treatment. Using data from all 131 patients with endpoint
data, the unadjusted difference in adherence was 14%.
Adherence to treatment was significantly higher in the
intervention group than in the control group (adjusted difference
in means (β) 11.5%, 95% confidence interval 3.9% to 19.0%,
P=0.003), representing on average and after adjustment for
covariates 11.5% greater adherence in the group receiving
financial incentives.
Sensitivity analyses
The results were similar between the analysis excluding those
with incorrect diagnoses or more than 75% adherence in the
four months before screening (β=10.7%, 95% confidence
interval 3.0% to 18.5%, P=0.006) and the sensitivity analysis
without adjustment for baseline adherence (β=11.6%, 3.7% to
19.5%, P=0.004). Excluding all patients with more than 75%
adherence for the whole baseline period gave an effect estimate
of 15.7%, and restricting the analysis only to patients with a
diagnosis of schizophrenia gave an estimate of 10.7%.
Secondary outcomes
Table 2 also shows the effect of financial incentives on the
secondary outcomes. For all 131 patients with primary outcome
data, the unadjusted odds ratio of achieving at least 95%
adherence was 7.11. The percentage of patients achieving at
least 95% adherence during the intervention period was
significantly higher in the intervention group than in the control
group (adjusted odds ratio 8.21, 95% confidence interval 2.00
to 33.67, P=0.003), as was participants’ subjective rating of
quality of life (β=0.71, 95% confidence interval 0.26 to 1.15,
P=0.002). Differences on clinician rated clinical improvement
were not statistically significant, although the odds of being
rated as improved were 2.73 times greater in the intervention
condition (95% confidence interval 0.64 to 11.59, P=0.174).
The number of admissions to hospital and adverse events were
low in both groups and did not show substantial differences.
No patient committed suicide in either group. Five patients in
the intervention group (one in the control group) were in
employment during the study period (intervention group: four
consistently, one for 18 days; control group: one for 26 days).
No patient was in formal education, and seven patients in the
intervention group (five in control group) attended some type
of training course.
Discussion
Offering financial incentives to patients with psychotic disorders
who have poor adherence to maintenance treatment with
antipsychotics is effective in improving adherence. In this study,
the average baseline adherence of 67% improved by only 4%
in the control group. Thus it remained largely unchanged, which
might be expected in people with severe psychotic disorders
and poor adherence. In the intervention group, offering financial
incentives led to an average adherence of 85%. Given the ceiling
effect of 100% adherence, this shift represents more than half
of the potentially possible maximum improvement. In the
intervention group, 21 (28%) achieved adherence of at least
95% compared with three (5%) in the control group.
Strengths and weaknesses of this study
The trial was conducted in a large number of teams. Outcome
data were available for 131 (93%) randomised participants and
statistically analysed for 123 (87%). Sensitivity analyses showed
that the findings on the primary outcome in the intervention
group were robust to a variety of assumptions.
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The study has some weaknesses. Several protocol violations
occurred and data were missing on depot treatment during the
baseline and study period. Blinding of clinicians, patients, and
researchers was not possible, and less than 50% of the final
sample had patient reported outcomes. The sample was confined
to those patients receiving long acting depot injections so the
results may not be generalisable to those receiving other
formulations, particularly as the practice of offering financial
incentives for patients taking oral drugs would be more
complicated. The study had no active control, and potential
expectancy effects of the cliniciansmay have influenced practice
and outcomes. All participating teams were willing to offer
financial incentives, at least within an experimental study, and
it remains unclear whether financial incentives would be
similarly effective when provided by those teams that did not
consent to participate in the study, usually because clinicians
or managers expressed an unwillingness to try financial
incentives.
Comparison with previous studies
Previous research suggested that financial incentives might be
effective in influencing the health behaviour of patients with
severe mental illness, and small observational studies reported
that this might also apply to adherence to maintenance treatment
with antipsychotics. We report the first randomised controlled
trial testing this hypothesis, providing evidence that offering
financial incentives is effective in improving treatment
adherence in this patient group.
Implications and explanations of findings
Did the improved adherence result in better clinical outcomes
in this study? The difference on clinician rated improvement
was not significant. Admissions to hospital and adverse events
were rare in both groups hence limiting the power of the study
to detect differences for these variables. Yet patients in the
intervention group reported a significantly more favourable
subjective quality of life. Consistent treatment may have helped
patients to organise their lives better, cope with problems, and
engage in satisfying activities. Other factors may also have
contributed to the improved subjective quality of life. Patients
in the intervention group had between £15 and £60 (depending
on the depot cycle) more to spend every month. This could have
made a difference to patients who received social benefits. It
can also be speculated that receiving money from services had
a psychological effect in some patients, increased their
confidence, and facilitated a more positive view of life.
Although those patients offered financial incentives were more
likely to have 95% or more adherence, practically complete
adherence was achieved in only 28% of these patients. The
incentive of £15 per injection used in this study did not provide
a solution for all patients with problematic adherence to
maintenance treatment with antipsychotics. However, we can
conclude that offering a modest financial incentive is the most
effectivemethod shown so far of improving treatment adherence
in this patient group. It should be considered if poor treatment
adherence poses a risk to patients’ health and social outcomes
and if other methods to achieve adherence have failed.
Community mental health teams and assertive outreach teams
in the National Health Service aim to follow up patients with
clinical risks and problematic adherence in the community, and
to do this proactively and consistently over longer periods of
time. In this context, we recruited on average about one patient
in each team who consented to participate. The low number
suggests that the practice of community mental health teams
and assertive outreach teams may be effective in ensuring good
adherence to long acting injections with most patients. How
many patients will qualify to be offered financial incentives if
the practice is rolled out? This is difficult to predict with
precision as eligibility in routine practice can be more flexibly
assessed than in rigorous research trials. If the clinical eligibility
criteria in this study are identically applied, however, teams are
likely to have on average no more than one or two eligible
patients at any time. This means that financial incentives may
be offered to fewer than about 1800 patients in the NHS across
England. This is a substantial, but limited, number, and whether
more patients may qualify in service contexts other than the one
provided by the NHS can only be speculated.
The ethical issues of offering financial incentives to increase
adherence to antipsychotic treatment have been discussed
elsewhere. The evidence for the effectiveness of incentives
provided in this study may inform the debate. All participants
in this study had consented to take their treatment and had a
certain level of adherence at baseline. Thus, financial incentives
helped them to overcome organisational and other problems
that had previously prevented them from more regular
adherence. However, incentives in our study were not used to
persuade otherwise non-consenting patients to accept treatment.
Future research
Whether offering higher financial incentives would be ethically
acceptable andmore effective, remains unclear. Further research
should test the longer term impact of offering financial
incentives. Qualitative research is required to identify the
psychological mechanisms that may explain the positive effect
of offering financial incentives on adherence and explore
whether the effect on subjective quality of life may result from
wider benefits for the engagement of patients and not only
improved adherence.
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What is already known on this topic
Interventions to improve adherence to maintenance treatment with antipsychotics in patients with psychosis have been relatively
ineffective
The use of financial incentives has been suggested and supported by case reports
No randomised trial has been done to test whether such incentives are effective for improving medication adherence in patients with
psychosis
What this study adds
Offering modest financial incentives was an effective method for improving adherence to long acting antipsychotic (depot) injections in
patients with psychosis
Adherence to treatment was significantly higher for those receiving financial incentives than those in the control group
Using data from all 131 patients with endpoint data, the unadjusted difference in adherence was 14%
the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the HTA programme,
NIHR, NHS, or the Department of Health. The trial is registered with
ISRCTN (SRCTN77769281) and is adopted into the UKCRN andMHRN
portfolios. The funder had no role in study design, data collection, data
analysis, interpretation, writing of the report, or decision to submit for
publication. All study researchers were independent from a funder. All
authors had full access to all of the data (including statistical reports
and tables) in the study and can take responsibility for the integrity of
the data and the accuracy of the data analysis.
Competing interests: All authors have completed the ICMJE uniform
disclosure form at www.icmje.org/coi_disclosure.pdf and declare: no
support from any organisation for the submitted work; ASD received
personal fees from Janssen-Cilag and Eli Lilly and TB received lecture
fees from Janssen and Otsuka during the conduct of the study; no other
relationships or activities that could appear to have influenced the
submitted work.
Ethical approval: This study was approved by the NRES Ealing and
West London Research Ethics Committee (reference No 09/H0710/35).
Data sharing: Patient level data and the statistical code are available
from the corresponding author at s.priebe@qmul.ac.uk. Consent for
data sharing was not obtained but the presented data are anonymised
and the risk of identification is low.
Declaration of transparency: The lead author affirms that this manuscript
is an honest, accurate, and transparent account of the study being
reported; that no important aspects of the study have been omitted; and
that any discrepancies from the study as planned (and, if relevant,
registered) have been explained. The lead author in this statement is
the study guarantor.
1 Novick D, Haro JM, Suarez D, Perez V, Dittmann RW, Haddad PM. Predictors and clinical
consequences of non-adherence with antipsychotic medication in the outpatient treatment
of schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res 2010;176:109-13.
2 Conley RR, Kelly DL. Management of treatment resistance in schizophrenia.Biol Psychiatry
2001;50:898-911.
3 Knapp M, King D, Pugner K, Lapuerta P. Non-adherence to antipsychotic medication
regimens: associations with resource use and costs. Br J Psychiatry 2004;184:509-16.
4 McDonald HP, Garg AX, Haynes RB. Interventions to enhance patient adherence to
medication prescriptions—scientific review. JAMA 2002;288:2868-79.
5 Nose M, Barbui C, Gray R, Tansella M. Clinical interventions for treatment non-adherence
in psychosis: meta-analysis. Br J Psychiatry 2003;183:197-206.
6 Gray R, Leese M, Bindman J, Becker T, Burti L, David A, et al. Adherence therapy for
people with schizophrenia. European multicentre randomised controlled trial. Br J
Psychiatry 2006;189:508-14.
7 National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health. Schizophrenia: core interventions in the
treatment and management of schizophrenia in adults in primary and secondary care
(Update). CG82. March 2009 ed. National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence,
2009:41.
8 Vieta E. Improving treatment adherence in bipolar disorder through psychoeducation. J
Clin Psychiatry 2005;66(suppl 1):24-9.
9 Giuffrida A, Torgerson DJ. Should we pay the patient? Review of financial incentives to
enhance patient compliance. BMJ 1997;315:703-7.
10 Marteau TM, Ashcroft RE, Oliver A. Using financial incentives to achieve healthy behaviour.
BMJ 2009;338:b1415.
11 Burton A, Marougka S, Priebe S. Do financial incentives increase treatment adherence
in people with severe mental illness? A systematic review. Epidemiol Psichiatr Soc
2010;19:233-42.
12 Carey KB, Carey MP. Enhancing the treatment attendance of mentally ill chemical abusers.
J Behav Ther Exp Psychiatry 1990;21:205-9.
13 Helmus TC, Saules KK, Schoener EP, Roll JM. Reinforcement of counseling attendance
and alcohol abstinence in a community-based dual-diagnosis treatment program: a
feasibility study. Psychol Addict Behav 2003;17:249-51.
14 Post EP, Cruz M, Harman J. Incentive payments for attendance at appointments for
depression among low-income African Americans. Psychiatr Serv 2006;57:414-6.
15 Roll JM, Higgins ST, Steingard S, McGinley M. Use of monetary reinforcement to reduce
the cigarette smoking of persons with schizophrenia: a feasibility study. Exp Clin
Psychopharmacol 1998;6:157-61
16 Roll JM, Chermack ST, Chudzynski JE. Investigating the use of contingency management
in the treatment of cocaine abuse among individuals with schizophrenia: a feasibility study.
Psychiatry Res 2004;125:61-4.
17 Shaner A, Roberts LJ, Eckman TA, Tucker DE, Tsuang JW, Wilkins JN, et al. Monetary
reinforcement of abstinence from cocaine among mentally ill patients with cocaine
dependence. Psychiatr Serv 1997;48:807-10.
18 Sigmon SC, Steingard S, Badger GJ, Anthony SL, Higgins ST. Contingent reinforcement
of marijuana abstinence among individuals with serious mental illness: a feasibility study.
Exp Clin Psychopharmacol 2000;8:509-17.
19 Tidey JW, O’Neill SC, Higgins ST. Contingent monetary reinforcement of smoking
reductions, with and without transdermal nicotine, in outpatients with schizophrenia. Exp
Clin Psychopharmacol 2002;10:241-7.
20 Tracy K, Babuscio T, Nich C, Kiluk B, Carroll KM, Petry NM, et al. Contingency
management to reduce substance use in individuals who are homeless with co-occurring
psychiatric disorders. Am J Drug Alcohol Abuse 2007;33:253-8.
21 Olson RP, Greenber DJ. Effects of contingency-contracting and decision-making groups
with chronic mental patients. J Consult Clin Psychol 1972;38:376-83.
22 Drebing CE, Van Ormer EA, Krebs C, Rosenheck R, Rounsaville B, Herz L, et al. The
impact of enhanced incentives on vocational rehabilitation outcomes for dually diagnosed
veterans. J Appl Behav Anal 2005;38:359-72.
23 Claassen D, Fakhoury WK, Ford R, Priebe S. Money for medication: financial incentives
to improve medication adherence in assertive outreach. Psychol Bull 2007;31:4-7.
24 Tidey JW. Using incentives to reduce substance use and other health risk behaviors
among people with serious mental illness. Prev Med 2012;55:S54-60.
25 Ries RK, Dyck DG, Short R, Srebnik D, Fisher A, Comtois KA. Outcomes of managing
disability benefits among patients with substance dependence and severe mental illness.
Psychiatr Serv 2004;55:445-7.
26 Staring AB, Mulder CL, Priebe S. Financial incentives to improve adherence to medication
in five patients with schizophrenia in the Netherlands. Psychopharmacol Bull 2010;43:5-10.
27 Wise J. NICE Citizens Council debates incentives for healthy behaviour. BMJ
2010;340:c2747.
28 Burns T. Is it acceptable for people to be paid to adhere to medication? Yes. BMJ
2007;335:232.
29 Shaw J. Is it acceptable for people to be paid to adhere to medication? No. BMJ
2007;335:233.
30 Cookson R. Should disadvantaged people be paid to take care of their health? Yes. BMJ
2008;337:a589.
31 Popay J. Should disadvantaged people be paid to take care of their health? No. BMJ
2008;337:a594.
32 Claassen D. Financial incentives for antipsychotic depot medication: ethical issues. J Med
Ethics 2007;33:189-93.
33 Promberger M, Brown RC, Ashcroft RE, Marteau TM. Acceptability of financial incentives
to improve health outcomes in UK and US samples. J Med Ethics 2011;37:682-7.
34 Priebe S, Sinclair J, Burton A, Marouqka S, Larsen J, Firn M, et al. Acceptability of offering
financial incentives to achieve medication adherence in patients with severe mental illness:
a focus group study. J Med Ethics 2010;36:463-8.
35 World Health Organization. The ICD-10 classification of mental and behavioural disorders:
diagnostic criteria for research: WHO, 1993.
36 GuyW. National Institute of Mental Health (US). Psychopharmacology Research Branch.
Division of Extramural Research Programs. ECDEU assessment manual for
psychopharmacology. US Dept. of Health, Education, andWelfare, Public Health Service,
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, andMental Health Administration, National Institute of Mental Health,
Psychopharmacology Research Branch, Division of Extramural Research Programs,
1976.
37 Priebe S, McCabe R, Bullenkamp J, Hansson L, Lauber C, Martinez-Leal R, et al.
Structured patient-clinician communication and 1-year outcome in community mental
healthcare—cluster randomised controlled trial. Br J Psychiatry 2007;191:420-6.
38 Priebe S, Golden E, McCabe R, Reininghaus U. Patient-reported outcome data generated
in a clinical intervention in community mental health care—psychometric properties. BMC
Psychiatry 2012;12:113.
39 Glover GR, Leese M, McCrone P. More severe mental illness is more concentrated in
deprived areas. Br J Psychiatry 1999;175:544-8.
40 Stata statistical 10.1 [program]. College Station, TX: StataCorp, 2009.
41 Ryan P. Random allocation of treatments in blocks. Stata Tech Bull 1998;41:43-6.
Accepted: 28 August 2013
Cite this as: BMJ 2013;347:f5847
No commercial reuse: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
BMJ 2013;347:f5847 doi: 10.1136/bmj.f5847 (Published 7 October 2013) Page 6 of 10
RESEARCH
This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with the Creative Commons
Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 3.0) license, which permits others to distribute,
remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially, and license their derivative works
on different terms, provided the original work is properly cited and the use is
non-commercial. See: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/.
No commercial reuse: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
BMJ 2013;347:f5847 doi: 10.1136/bmj.f5847 (Published 7 October 2013) Page 7 of 10
RESEARCH
Tables
Table 1| Characteristics of participants at baseline. Values are numbers (percentages) unless stated otherwise
Control group (n=63)Intervention group (n=78)Total (n=141)Missing dataCharacteristics
42.7 (10.2)44.4 (9.6)43.7 (9.8)0 (0)Mean (SD) age (years)
46 (73)59 (76)105 (74)0 (0)Men
11.2 (1.5)10.9 (1.7)11.0 (1.6)29 (21)Mean (SD) years of education
3 (2)Ethnicity:
34 (57)49 (63)83 (60)White
14 (23)17 (22)31 (22)Black
4 (7)5 (6)9 (7)Asian
8 (13)7 (9)15 (11)Mixed and other
Living situation:
10 (16)8 (10)18 (13)3 (2)Married or cohabiting
49 (83)53 (68)102 (74)39 (28)Independent accommodation
34 (62)41 (62)75 (62)20 (14)Living alone
1 (2)3 (4)4 (3)3 (2)Paid employment
58 (100)76 (99)134 (99)6 (4)Receiving benefits
110 (78)46 (73)64 (82)0 (0)Living in high deprivation area (MINI score)
Diagnosis:
52 (82)61 (78)113 (80)Schizophrenia
8 (12)9 (12)17 (12)Schizoaffective disorder
1 (2)6 (8)7 (5)Bipolar disorder
1 (2)2 (2)3 (2)Other psychosis disorder
1 (2)0 (0)1 (<1)Other diagnosis
Clinical history:
17.3 (8.5)18.2 (8.6)17.8 (8.5)14 (10)Mean (SD) duration of illness (years)
12 (20)20 (26)32 (23)3 (2)≥1 hospital admissions in past year
4 (7)3 (4)7 (5)4 (3)CTO at time of randomisation
2.5 (0.9)2.4 (0.8)2.4 (0.9)7 (5)Mean (SD) average prescription cycle during baseline
MINI=mental illness needs index; CTO=community treatment order.
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71% (22%)5685% (15%)75One year study period
Secondary outcomes





4.9 (1.0)325.2 (0.8)56End of study period
Satisfaction with medication




5.3 (1.3)325.6 (1.5)56End of study period
Outcomes in intervention
group:
0.13 (0.43)600.15 (0.49)78No of voluntary hospital
admissions
0.27 (0.63)600.31 (0.96)78No of involuntary hospital
admissions
Adverse events
0.10 (0.41)580.13 (0.41)77No of suicide attempts
580.25 (0.78)77No of violent incidents
570.18 (0.53)77No of police arrests





3 (5%)5621 (28%)75One year study period
No of patients achieving
clinical improvement on CGI:
0.440.1742.73 (0.64 to
11.59)§
9618 (41%)4433 (58%)57End of study period
CGI=clinical global improvement; ICC=model based intracluster correlation coefficient.
*Each model adjusted for baseline measure of outcome (except when clinical global improvement was outcome), mental illness needs index score category (low
v high), and average treatment cycle during baseline, and includes a random effect for team.
†Adjusted difference in means (95% CI) from linear mixed effects model.
‡Adjusted difference in means from random effects model fitted by generalised least squares.
§Adjusted odds ratio (95% CI) from logistic mixed effects model.
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Figure
Flow of participants through study
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